I develop a model of financial sector in which endogenous intermediation among debt financed banks generates excessive systemic risk. The central idea is to explore the possibility that certain financial institutions are able to use their lending and borrowing decisions to tilt the division of surplus in their own favor through capturing intermediation spreads, even if the implied change in the structure of financial system hurts the total surplus of the economy. The paper predicts that there is excessive connection among banks who make risky investments and too little connection among those who mainly provide funding. Inefficiency arises because the financial institutions who intermediate among other institutions are exposed to excessive counterparty risk: replacing them with certain other banks mitigates the extent of failure when it is inevitable without hurting the optimal level of investment. In equilibrium, intermediators choose to over expose themselves to other risky banks and suffer the cost of failure due to contagion if they absorb enough rents when they survive. * I am extremely grateful to my advisors Douglas Diamond, Lars Hansen, Zhigou He and Raghuram Rajan for their invaluable input. I would also like to thank
Introduction
In the past few years following the financial crisis the architecture of financial markets has been under increasing scrutiny, and many economists as well as policy makers suggested that the structure in place in 2008 was not socially optimal. In particular, it has been argued that one of the major sources of systemic risk has been excessive cross-exposure among banks, leading to a widespread meltdown caused by failure of only few banks. Another highly debated notion is existence of too-connected-to-fail financial institutions and how regulation should deal with them.
High degree of interconnectedness among financial institutions has been frequently recognized by policy makers. Federal Reserve chairman Ben Bernanke, in his senate testimony on April 3, 2008 after bail out of Bear Stearns said: "Our financial system is extremely complex and interconnected, and Bear Stearns participated extensively in a range of critical markets. The sudden failure of Bear Stearns likely would have led to a chaotic unwinding of positions in those markets and could have severely shaken confidence. The company's failure could have also cast doubt on the financial positions of some of Bear Stearns' thousand of counterparties and perhaps of companies with similar businesses."
During the same senate hearing undersecretary of finance, Robert Steel, mentioned the following defending the bail out: "The failure of a firm that was connected to so many corners of our market would have caused financial disruptions beyond Wall Street. We weighted the multiple risks, such as the potential disruptions to counterparties, other financial institutions, the markets, and the market infrastructure."
Moreover, policy makers have realized that effective policy design requires much deeper understanding of how and why banks form their connections. As Donald Kohn, vice chairman of Federal Reserve Board, pointed out in his senate testimony on June 5, 2008: "Supervisors need to enhance their understanding of the direct and indirect relationships among markets and market participants, and the associated impact on the banking system. Supervisors must also be even more keenly aware of the manner in which those relationships within and among markets and market participants can change over time and how those relationships behave in times of stress-not just at banking institutions, but also at other financial firms that play prominent roles in financial markets and whose actions and condition can have an impact on financial stability."
Although the importance of understanding how financial institutions connect is widely acknowledged, we still lack sufficiently rich models that are able to address this question. Most of the related academic research has focused on the effect of negative shocks given the current architecture of the financial system, as well as appropriate policy design to alleviate such effect.
1 It is crucial to reiterate that any policy which is implemented to mitigate risk in the current state of the financial architecture could feed back into bank decisions on their inter-linkages. As a result, it is impossible to quantify how effective a policy is, or even if it will entail the desired outcomes, without taking this feedback effect into account. In this paper, I present a model where the bilateral exposure of financial institutions emerge endogenously from their profit maximizing decisions. I model banks and their interlinkages as a network in which the equilibrium financial architecture is the outcome of an endogenous network formation game with a role for inter-bank intermediation.
The model predicts that there are too many interconnections among banks who are actively involved in risky investment and too few interconnections among those who mainly provide funding, which leads to aggregate welfare losses. In short, private incentives to provide intermediation that arise endogenously lead to socially inefficient exposure to counterparty risk. The main intuition is that when default (or equivalently in this model, failure) is costly, efficiency requires reaching the optimal scale of investment while minimizing the loss of failure, so social incentives balance net gain from investment with the expected loss of default. On the contrary, individual incentives compare rents (in the form of intermediation spreads) with cost of default. The cost of default is a real cost while intermediation spreads are a mere redistribution of surplus, so the social and private incentives does not necessarily align. Since intermediation is profitable per-se, banks compete to intermediate among each other and in equilibrium banks who are able to offer highest returns become intermediaries. However, these intermediaries are exposed to excessive risk since they do not contribute to the investment except through intermediation. The social planner prefers leaving them out of the intermediation chain, by replacing them with intermediaries who do not take any extra risk by intermediating, to confine the risk as much as possible without hurting the scale of investment.
As a result in contrast with Gale and Kariv [2007] and Blume et al. [2009] which suggest that financial architecture does not matter for efficiency, my model predicts that financial structure can entail efficiency losses. The main driving result of this difference is presence of intermediation rents which prevents social and private incentives to align in my setting.
Consistent with predictions of the model, there is direct evidence from the financial crisis on substantial exposure among large financial institutions which entailed runs and subsequent failure of one entity following his counterparty failure. A prominent example, as reported in FCIC report on the financial crisis, is the immediate run on holders of Lehman unsecured Commercial Paper (CP) and lenders to Lehman in tri-party repo, such as Wachovia's Evergreens Investment and Reserve Management Company's Reserve Primary Fund, after Lehman failed on September 15, 2008. This was followed by a second wave of withdrawal from Lehman OTC counterparties, most notably UBS and Deutche Bank.
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Besides efficiency implications the model has sharp predictions about the topology of the interbank market. I find that the equilibrium financial structure is a core-periphery network, with (a subset of) banks who invest at the core. In other words, consistent with calibrated model of Gofman [2012] as well as the empirical evidence on Fed funds market and other interbank markets (Bech and Atalay [2010] , Allen and Saunders [1986] , , Afonso and Lagos [2012] Afonso et al. [2011] and Atkeson et al. [2013] , my model predicts that there are a small number of very interconnected banks that trade with many other banks and a large number of banks that trade with a small number of counterparties.
Finally, the model predicts high gross and low net exposures among core banks. There are previous papers that predict a star structure for the interbank network (for instance Babus [2012] ), however most of these models are unable to generate high gross and low net exposures for the core since by construction their core is a single bank. The one notable exception is Atkeson et al. [2013] . While they do not explicitly model the banking network, their endogenous bilateral trade structure has similar implications, although through a very different mechanism.
In the context of the model, bilateral exposure among banks are their lending decisions. There are two groups of banks in the model: banks who occasionally get the chance to invest in a risky investment opportunity, and banks who never get access to such opportunities. Banks do not own any resources of their own. They need to raise resources either from households if they get the opportunity to do so, or they have to borrow directly or indirectly from other banks who have raised money from households. Indirect borrowing gives rise to endogenous intermediation among banks, which is a prominent feature of both Fed fund market and over-the-counter market for derivative (Bech and Atalay [2010] , Gofman [2012] and Atkeson et al. [2013] ).
In order for banks to borrow from each other, they need to establish credit lines before the risky investment opportunities arise. Aside from the risky investment opportunity, every bank has a value associated with its other businesses, assets, etc which is lost if the bank fails.
The markets are incomplete: first, the return on the investment is not contractible, so the only instrument to borrow funds is debt. Second, the decision to open a credit line is made before the realization of investment opportunity, and once investment opportunities realize lending can only happen over established credit lines. In other words, banks cannot change their lending decision based on the realization of the investment opportunities.
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This assumption is to capture the long term relationship between lenders and borrowers in the inter-bank market. This assumption is consistent with findings of Afonso et al. [2011] which shows that in the Fed Funds market approximately 60% of the funds an individual bank borrows in one month persistently come from the same lender. Third, there is a bargaining friction of the following form: For every unit of funds originated 4 at bank l and intermediated to bank b through a sequence of intermediaries, every intermediary along the chain, as well as the initial lender and final borrower get strictly positive share of the surplus, and every bank's share is decreasing in the number of intermediaries. Positive intermediation spreads are reported in both Fed fund market (Gofman [2011] and Gofman [2012] ) and OTC market (Atkeson et al. [2013] ). Finally, I assume that there is a minimum size constraint on each lending relationship, so each bank effectively faces a constraint on how many banks he can lend to based on the funds he has available (either borrowed from households or from other banks).
5 This constraint implies that not every bank with excess fund can lend to every bank with an investment opportunity, so intermediation is necessary to channel funds from the bank who raises the fund to the bank who can invest it. The investment technology is a risky one. If the investment fails and the borrower does not have sufficient funds to pay back his lender(s), he will fail and there can also be a cascade of failures to his lenders, lenders of lenders and so on. Anticipating the possibility of cascade, each bank weights the gains from intermediating funds toward banks with investment opportunities against expected loss of failure due to contagion and decides his optimal lending and borrowing relationships. The collection of banks' mutually consistent lending and borrowing decisions constitute the financial network.
In the context of the model, efficiency calls for isolating the risk as much as possible without hurting the optimal scale of investment, while stability is driven by incentives of banks to earn highest possible returns by cutting the intermediation chains as much as possible. Inefficiency arises when these two forces do not align, and it is in the form of excessive exposure to counterparty risk. This outcome occurs because there is a competition among banks to be an intermediator since intermediation is profitable. From a socially optimal perspective, the best intermediators are the ones who are positively contributing to the scale of investment, so that they are already exposed optimally to the risk of failure if the risky investment fail.
6 However, these are not necessarily the banks who end up being the intermediators in equilibrium, rather, they are the banks who are able to offer higher rates to their lenders. To the extent that the two groups of banks do not coincide, the latter group is over-exposed to risk of failure and amplifies the loss due to investment failure above and beyond what is socially optimal. One can also interpret the implications of the model in terms of contagion and systemic risk.
7 Investment and funding opportunities arise at different banks, so funds should be channeled from banks with liquidity surplus to the ones with investment opportunities. This decentralized distribution of resources and investment opportunities gives rise to endogenous interbank intermediation. Moreover, the return to risky investment is not contractible, so all the bank liabilities are of the form debt, which leads to failure if obligations are not met. As a result, lenders and intermediators are exposed to counterparty risk (when the investment fails). Since investment is positive NPV, there is an optimal level of contagion and systemic risk in order to provide funding for the projects. In other words even the financial structure chosen by a social planner involves a certain level of contagion when risky investment fails. The important prediction of the model is that the equilibrium interbank network involves excessive contagion and systemic risk, more than what is necessary to support the optimal level of investment. Multiple policies targeting the structure of financial network can be studied in the context of the model. Part of Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act was a proposed cap on the number of counterparties and swaps, which was later eliminated from the finalized rules.
8 Gofman [2012] calibrates a model of bank bilateral-exposures using Fed fund data to empirically study the welfare effects of this policy and suggests that such policy can entail potentially large welfare losses since banks would not be able to effectively channel funds to profitable investment opportunities. The current paper provides sharp theoretical predictions about such policy: in the context of the model, there exist financial structures which would allow optimal scale of investment without entailing excessive risk of failure, but such efficient allocation of funds requires intermediaries 6 In other words, there is an optimal level of exposure to counterparty risk.
7 Contagion refers to a scenario in which shocks which initially affect only a few financial institutions spread to the rest of financial sectors. Systemic risk is the risk of collapse of an entire financial system or a large part of it, as opposed to risk associated with any one individual entity.
8 Please refer to Stroock Special Bulletin for more detail.
with many connections. Imposing an intermediation cap independent of characteristics of banks would prevent this efficient allocation and lead to under-investment. In other words, the model does not suggest that the scale of intermediation should be reduced. However, it is important that banks who take on the intermediation role either contribute to the scale of investment themselves, i.e. intermediation does not expose them to extra risk of failure, or they purely specialize in investment so that their failure does not impose any losses other than anything related to the risky investment. Moreover, the model provides a new rational for introduction of a Central Clearing Party (CCP). Designating a non-investing bank as the CCP and enforcing all the lending to go through CCP has welfare gains by reducing loss in the event of default since it prevents excessive cross-exposure among banks with investment opportunities. Note that this effect is independent of any diversification gains that a CCP may provide. Introduction of the CCP allows efficient allocation of fund through a single intermediary which in turn prevents intermediation by banks who would choose to expose themselves to excessive probability of default to absorb the intermediation rents. The model predicts that such structure, although socially efficient, is not an equilibrium when intermediation rents are sufficiently large, so intervention is necessary to implement this financial structure. This paper is related to multiple strands of the literature. First and foremost, as a model of interbank network, this paper is closely related to application of networks in economics (two early seminal papers are Jackson and Wolinsky [1996] and Bala and Goyal [2000] ). Jackson [2010] ,Jackson [2005] and Allen and Babus [2009] provide excellent reviews of the existing work. Applications of networks to financial market did not attract much attention until more recently, specially after the financial crisis. The literature on contagion and systemic risk in financial networks started with the seminal work of Allen and Gale [2000] who considered propagation of negative shocks in a simple financial network. Due to the complexity of modeling strategic interactions which lead to network formation, many papers have focused on properties of large networks or have taken the structure of the network as given (Eisenberg and Noe [2001] , Elliott et al. [2012] , Gofman [2011] , Gai and Kapadia [2010] ,Caballero and Simsek [2012] ). There are a few more recent papers which specifically focus on strategic network formation (Acemoglu et al. [2013] , Blume et al. [2011] , Babus [2013] , Allen et al. [2012] , Moore [2011] , Rotemberg [2008] , Zawadowski [2011] and Zawadowski [2013] , Bluhm et al. [2013] , Cabrales et al. [2012] ). My paper best fits in this latter category, and adds to it by allowing general network structures to form and still characterize a particular family of networks, consistent with financial architectures observed in the data, to form in equilibrium.
Another line of literature which is closely related to my paper is the literature on role of banks as intermediaries, optimal debt structure and issues related to insolvency. An incomplete list includes Diamond [1984] , Rochet and Tirole [1996] , Kiyotaki and Moore [1997] Bhattacharya and Gale [1987] , Bolton and Scharfstein [1996] , Diamond and Rajan [2005] and Gorton and Metrick [2012] . I add to this literature by specifically modeling the role of banks as intermediaries among each other and the corresponding implications for the structure and efficiency of interbank market, as well as systemic risk.
Finally, there is a large literature on bargaining and intermediation in general settings (Abreu and Manea [2012] and Elliott [2013] ), as well as in (financial) networks (Gale and Kariv [2007] , Manea [2013] , Gofman [2011] and Babus [2012] ). In all of these models except Babus [2012] intermediaries are determined exogenously. In my model, as well as Babus [2012] , certain agents endogenously assume role of intermediaries which can lead to welfare losses in equilibrium.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the model. Section 3 solves for the equilibrium and social planner problem for an economy with four banks. Section 4 provides general results for the economy with unrestricted number of banks. Section ?? provides policy implications, as well as a few special cases and extensions of the model. Section 5 concludes.
Model
The model has three periods, t = 0, 1, 2, and one good which I refer to as funds. There are two types of agents: bankers who run banks and households. There are K banks in the economy, each run by a banker:
9 banks who get random risky investment opportunities (type I) and banks who don't (type N I). Let I and NI denote the set of I and N I banks, respectively, and let N = I ∪ NI. There are k I banks of type I and k N I banks of type N I. The financial system consists of banks and their bilateral exposures. The bilateral exposures represent lending and borrowing relationships among banks. It is worth mentioning that bilateral exposures among banks are quite complex in the world. Banks can be exposed to each other through multiple channels: securitized and unsecuritizes lending, derivative contracts and holding similar assets. For the purpose of this paper, I will confine myself to exposures through debt contracts (lending). Bank i who lends to bank j through a debt contract is exposed to bank j since if bank j fails, he will not be able to pay bank i back, which affects the balance sheet of bank i and might cause i to fail.
I model the financial system as a network. The financial network is a directed graph G = (N, E), where N = {1, 2, · · · , K} is the set of nodes and E = {e ij } i,j∈V is the set of edges. Each node is a bank, and edge e ij ∈ E is a lending contract from bank i to bank j. So graph G represents the collection of banks and their lending-borrowing agreements.
There is a second group of agents in the model, namely households. There are k continuums of households in the economy. Continuum h of household has random size s h ∈ [0,s] distributed via CDF H h (.). Each household is endowed with unit per capita endowment. Throughout the paper, I will use the following convention:x denotes a random variable, and x denotes the realization of that random variable.
The investment opportunity is a risky asset. Each bank I receives the opportunity to invest in the risky asset with probability q which is iid across all I bank. LetĨ R denote the random variable corresponding to the subset of I who receive the opportunity, and I R be the realization of such subset. LetR i ∈ [0,R] denote the random return of bank i investment in risky asset.R i is distributed according to cumulative distribution F (.) per unit of investment and is linearly scalable. Besides the risky investment opportunity, each bank i (of type I or N I) has a value V i , which is the value of its other businesses, assets, and services that the bank provides. If the bank fails for any reason, this value is lost.
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Bankers do not have any wealth. They have to raise resources from households if they get a chance to do so. Both I and N I banks can potentially raise resources. Bank i can access continuum i of households with probability p f . Let N F denote the subset of all banks who receive the opportunity to raise funding from households. Each bank who receives such opportunity raises total s i units from the continuum of households he meets in the form of short-term debt. Since each set of households is a continuum, they are competitive and they lend their endowment to their corresponding bank if they break even.
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A bank can raise funds from two sources: He might meet households in which case he borrows all of their endowment, or he can borrow from other banks. All the borrowing is of the form of debt. Each bank chooses his borrowing and lending relationships, subject to a minimum size constraint, to maximize his expected profit net of failure cost.
The timing of the model is as follows: At t = 0 the funding opportunities are realised and the potential lending and borrowing contracts are formed. A link e ij means bank j can borrow from i in the period which follows. At t = 1, investment opportunities are realized and actual lending happens only along (some of) the links formed at t = 0.
12 At t = 2 random returns are realized and banks who are not able to pay back their creditors fail. There is no possibility for holding precautionary liquidity, so banks lend or invest as much resources as they are able to.
Lending Contracts
Lending contracts are formed before banks receive their investment opportunities. e ij represents bank i conditional commitment to lend to bank j subject to terms of lending contract, to be explained shortly. In this sense, lending contracts are conditional credit lines. In short, i has to lend at least one unit to j if bank j receives an investment opportunity, or if j is able to intermediate the fund to an investment opportunity that i cannot access through fewer intermediaries. In other words, set {j|e ij exists} is the set of all banks that i chooses to be able to lend to, or bank i relationship borrowers, and set {j|e ji exists} contains bank i relationship lenders.
There is a minimum size on each lending contract, normalized to 1. In other words, in order to be able to be a potential lender to multiple other banks, a lender bank must have sufficient funds to lend at least one unit to each borrower in the event that every borrower draws on the credit line, i.e. every lending contract binds.
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Assumption 1. There is a minimum size on each lending contract, normalized to one unit.
This assumption implies a step cost function for number of lending contracts. If the maximum number of lending relationships that can simultaneously bind for bank i is less than the total funds pledged to him, there is zero cost associated with each lending contract.
The cost goes to infinity if the number gets larger than number of units pledged to i as defined above.
There is perfect information: Every bank knows the set I and NI, the structure of the formed lending contracts, the realization of the investment opportunities and the realization of final returns. However, as already mentioned markets are incomplete: first, the realization of returns are not contractible, so all the contracts are of the form of debt. Second, the potential lending contracts are formed before investment opportunities are realized.
Given that the only restriction on lending relationships is 1, financial network G can be quite complex. The following definition are useful to explain the reminder of the model. Definition 1. Given financial network G, a "path" from bank i to bank j is a sequence of
bank i is "connected" to bank j if there is a path from bank i to bank j. For every unit of money raised from households at bank i, invested by bank j, and intermediated through a number of intermediaries {i 1 , · · · , i m }, the sequence of banks involved {i, i 1 , · · · , i m , j} (or any subsequence of it) is called an "intermediation chain" (or simply a "chain"). Banks {i 1 , · · · , i m } are "intermediators" along the chain.
The "shortest path" from bank i to j, SP (i, j), is the path which involves minimum number of intermediaries.
The "distance" from bank i to j is the number of edges along the shortest path between i and j, denoted by dist(i, j).
Households are competitive because they are a continuum. They lend to their corresponding bank as long as they break even.Unlike households, banks are not competitive. For each set of funding and investment opportunities, N F and I R , and set of lending contracts, E, a subset of lendings will be realized. There is a fixed distribution of expected total surplus over all the banks involved in raising, intermediating and investing the funds, denoted by L(G, N F , I R ) which is a primitive of the model. With some abuse of notation let L(i; G, N F , I R ) denote the share of bank i. L(.) should satisfy the following properties: First, the net expected surplus from each unit of investment 14 is divided only among the banks in the corresponding intermediation chain. Second, for every unit of funds, every member of the corresponding intermediation chain receives strictly positive share of net surplus generated by that unit. 15 Third, eliminating an intermediator from an intermediation chain weakly increase share of any other bank along the chain, and strictly increase share of initial lender. Moreover, renegotiation and side payments are ruled out.
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Every lending contract is subject to the following simple rule which specifies the conditions under which the lending is realized, as well as the face value of debt that should be paid back to the lender. For every realization of I R and every bank i who has raised funding from households, let I i R ⊂ I R denote the set of I banks who have received an investment opportunity and to whom i is connected. First note that i should have sufficient funds (pledged to him) that he can (directly or indirectly) lend at least one unit to eachÎ ∈ I i R . The rule indicates that total funds pledged to i are equally divided amongÎ ∈ I i R and for every such I, the corresponding unit(s) is(are) intermediated through SP (i,Î). This implies that in the interim period, a lender is able to channel his funds to the investment opportunities through the path which has minimum number of intermediators, which provides him with maximum return. The intuition is that when a bank can lend through multiple intermediaries, he will choose the option that provides him with the highest possible rates.
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What the lender is not able to do in the interim period is to add a new lending contract. As a result, only lending contracts along such shortest paths are realized at t = 1.
Moreover, if I 1 and I 2 both receive investment opportunities and credit line e I 1 I 2 has been formed at date t = 0, I 1 does not need to honor the credit line and invests all the funds pledged to him in his own project. In this sense, ex-ante lending commitments are conditional on the availability if own project.
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Finally, the face value of the debt is contingent on realization of I R and equilibrium network G, and is set such that in expectation (over realizations of random returns
19 a large share of the surplus once the potential connections are in place. From an empirical prospective, intermediation spreads are prominent in both Fed fund market and OTC trades.
16 One can think that once the actual investment and funding opportunities arrive, banks would want to change their lending decisions. As I will explain in the text shortly, the current model is a reduced form model for a dynamic game. When funding and investment opportunities arrive at different times and there is a high enough cost associated with finding, verifying and matching with borrowers, a lender prefers to be intermediated through his current borrower to a bank who has an investment opportunity compared to search and switch every period. In this sense renegotiation is not a big issue. In addition, since investment happens at t = 1 and non-contractible return is realized at t = 2, the borrower cannot commit to pay the lender a side payment above and beyond the face value of debt enforceable by the contract. Note that in the period when actual lending happens there is no extra funds to make an early side payment. As a result, ruling out side payments is also a reasonable assumption.
17 In other words, any unnecessary intermediation is avoided. 18 This rule is to simplify the exposition and is not essential for the results. In particular, the conditional part is only to disentangle effect of diversification from intermediation. I will relax the rule later and discuss how it affects the results.
19 I have chosen this structure to avoid any additional market incompleteness except that each bank can only choose a (limited) set of counterparties and then has to execute all of his trades through
The set of lending commitments along with the bank themselves constitute G. As already mentioned, in the interim period a subset of the lending commitments are actually realized. After the investment opportunity is realized, if i wants to be able to borrow from j link e ji needs to exist in G.
This particular choice of G warrants some explanation, since it does not refer to the realized financial network. This representation captures a reduced form for the dynamic game played among banks, such as the one described in Moore [2011] . In the full dynamic game of Moore [2011] in each period some banks receive funding and some banks receive investment opportunities and lending happens each period. 20 In the subsequent periods, borrower banks find it optimal not to pay back their debt straight away and instead lend their levered up resources to other banks who have an investment opportunity. The simplification that I have made abstracts away from these detailed dynamics. Abstracting away from dynamics of network formation allows me to instead focus on characterizing the properties of the equilibrium network.
There are three types of lender-borrower pairs in this model: First, a bank without investment opportunity (N I) always wants to lend out his money. He will lend it out to either an I or another N I bank, whichever gives him a larger share of surplus (N I → I or N I → N I lending). Second, a bank with possibility of investment opportunity (I) can form a link to another I bank, to be able to lend to and get part of the surplus from the latter's risky project in case he does not receive an investment opportunity himself (I → I lending). Note that for a lending to happen in equilibrium both parties should prefer to keep the lending relationship.
At t = 1, given the equilibrium network G and each realization of funding and investment opportunities (N F and I R ), the contracts determine the number of units lent along each potential lending agreement, as well as the face value of debt corresponding to this realized lending. Let m ij = m(i, j; G, N F , I R ) and D ij = D(i, j; G, N F , I R ) denote the size and face value of the debt from bank i to j, and let D h i = D(i; G, N F , I R ) be the face value of debt from i to households.
At t = 2, given any realization of project returns {R k } k∈I R , the borrower might or might night be able to pay lenders back in full. Let
denote the per unit repayment bank i makes to lender bank these established counterparties. This structure is consistent with costly establishment of relationship lending (information, trust, etc), as well as the observation that hedge funds, even large ones, typically maintained only one or two prime brokerage relationships and did not frequently switch.
(https://www.wellsfargo.com/downloads/pdf/com/securities/hedge-fund-risk.pdf).
20 Moore [2011] assumes a bank cannot invest in own project.
j and households, respectively. As a convention,
denote the total liabilities and assets of bank i at date 2 when all the uncertainty is unfolded:
where 1[i ∈ I R ] is the indicator function which takes value 1 if i has access to an investment opportunity. Consequently, the per unit (partial) repayment from i to j in each state of the world can be written as
and a similar expression holds for d h i . The above expression simply means that if borrower does not have sufficient funds to pay his lenders back, each lender will be paid back pro-rata, and there is limited liability.
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The next proposition states that given any network G, realizations (N F , I R , {R k } k∈I R ) and face values of debt {D ij } i,j∈N and {D h i } i∈N F set at date t = 1, the above system of equations has a unique solution. Proposition 1. Given any set of funding and investment opportunities, a potential lending network G and face value of realized lending contracts, system of equations (1) has a unique solution.
The above proposition is similar to payment equilibrium of Acemoglu et al. [2013] and clearing vector of Eisenberg and Noe [2001] . The proof of the proposition, as well as all other proofs of the paper, are provided in the appendix.
Given the solution to system of (partial) debt repayments at t = 2, specified by (1), using backward induction the face value of each debt contract at date t = 1 is set such that in expectation, each bank i receives his share of surplus according to L(i; G, N F , I R ). This completes the specification of contracts.
Bank Optimization Problem
Let S(i; G, N F , I R , {R i } i∈I R ) denote the ex-post profit of bank i which can be written as
be the indicator function which is one if bank i survives at t = 2 and zero otherwise. With this notation, banker i's optimization problem at t = 0 can be written as:
where the expectation is taken over both realization of investment opportunity (at date t = 1) which determines I R , and realization of project returns (at date t = 2), {R k } k∈I R ). The choices of other banks are reflected in G. As I will explain shortly, the notion of equilibrium here is not Nash pairwise stability of Jackson and Wolinsky [1996] which only allows for unilateral (breaking links) or bilateral (adding a link) deviations.Rather I will use a notion of equilibrium which allows coalition of banks to deviate simultaneously. Moreover, the equilibrium choice of banks should satisfy assumption (1).
Note that V i is a constant, so one can write the expectation of the indicator function for bank i survival as a probability function. Let P (i; G, N F ) denote the probability that bank i survives given the funding realizations and financial network G formed at t = 0:
Problem (2) can be simplified to:
The intuition for the bank optimization problem is the following: Consider the first term in the above objective function. Since the banking sector is non-competitive and all players get part of the surplus, each bank would like to use the structure of his connections to extract more rents. Note that iid investment returns across different investor banks I ∈ I R implies that for any given aggregate scale of investment in the asset, total net surplus is independent of the distribution of investment among banks. As a result, as long as the identity of intermediators does not change the scale of the project, the rent seeking activity translates to a change the division of surplus in favor of intermediators, without any aggregate welfare implications. However, this is not the only effect of a change in the identity of the intermediator. Intuitively, all banks along the path of intermediation are exposed to risk of failure if the investment fails, so a change in the set of banks who do the intermediation also changes the cost of default.
22 As a result the identity and characteristics of the intermediary does not merely have a redistribution effect. Each bank balances the costs and benefits of exposure to more risk via intermediation and chooses the set of lending and borrowing relationship which maximizes his total expected profit.
Equilibrium
I will use a notion of equilibrium which allows for coalition of banks to jointly deviate. The equilibrium notion is a variation of Strong Nash equilibrium as defined in Aumann [1959] .
Definition 2. A financial equilibrium is a collection of lending contracts (ex-ante formed) among banks which satisfies the following property: There is no coalition of banks of size at most k, B k , and a set of unilateral deviations by b i ∈ B k and bilateral deviations by b i , b j ∈ B k such that taking all other banks actions as given, every member of the deviation gets strictly higher expected profit if the deviation is played. 23 .
The equilibrium notion is very similar to Strong Nash equilibrium concept with two differences: On one hand, it is weaker than Strong Nash equilibrium since the size of the deviating coalition is restricted to be k. k = K would imply Strong Nash equilibrium. On the other hand, it is stronger than Strong Nash equilibrium since it requires that every member of the deviating coalition should be strictly better off.
In the next section I will assume k = 4, i.e. at most 4 banks are able to collectively (as defined above) deviate to an outcome that each of them individually strictly prefer. Note that any member of the coalition can unilaterally sever any of his lending or borrowing relationship regardless of the other party involved (i.e. unilateral deviation does not require mutual consent), while bilateral deviations are only allowed among the k members of the 22 For the intermediator himself, as well as potentially for other banks through a diversification effect. 23 This is stronger than the notion of coalition-proof equilibrium with deviation of size at most k coalition. I will use Strong strict Nash equilibrium notion later in the paper for more general results.
Note that in this model banks can play three roles (or a combination of the three) ex-post: lenders, borrower and/or intermediators. For any unit of investment that takes place, a lender and a borrower are crucial since one has the funds and the other the ability to invest. Moreover, frictional lending markets require some level of intermediation to reach the optimal scale of investment some intermediation. Given that there are positive intermediation spreads, intermediation per-se is profitable, so banks compete for it and the banks who are able to offer the highest rate of return to lenders win and intermediate in equilibrium. However, private incentives to determine whether to become an intermediary or not compares loss of default with rents associate with intermedition, which does not necessarily align with social incentives: the first one (default) is an actual welfare loss, while the second one (intermediation rents) is a mere redistribution of surplus which is irrelevant from social perspectives. Social optimality requires minimizing the cost of failure while maintaining the optimal scale of investment, which in the context of the model implies separation of risk and intermediation, which is not what individual optimization entails. This misalignment of social and private incentives leads to inefficient equilibria.
Lending Structure and Division of Surplus
In this section I specify highly tractable rule for surplus division, α-rule, which I use throughout the paper. In the appendix I show that the results go through with any fixed 24 surplus division L which satisfies the properties mentioned earlier, i.e. any rule which gives positive share of surplus to all the banks along each intermediation chain, and the share of lender is strictly decreasing in the number of intermediaries along the chain.
25
Consider an intermediation chain of infinite length, and one unit of funds intermediated along the chain. The share of net surplus received by each bank along the chain, starting from the final borrower, falls at rate α, so that the initial lender (who is infinitely far away) receives negligible share of net surplus and only breaks even, so he only receives the cost of initial investment. Since sum of the shares should add up to one, the final borrower receives share (1 − α), the immediate intermediator receives (1 − α)α, and intermediator at distance i receives (1−α)α i . Now suppose the initial lender is at distance k (instead of being 24 Perfect rigidity is not necessary. As long as the intermediator cannot forgo all of his rents, the possibility of inefficiency exists although the conditions become more extreme. The core-periphery structure of the financial system is also preserved.
25 Two such alternative division rules are discussed in the appendix.
Figure 1: α-Rule for Surplus Division infinitely far away). He will receive the cumulative share of all hypothetical intermediators at distance k and longer, so he would receive α k share of net surplus plus the cost of initial investment. This particular division of surplus implies that the lender bears all the cost of intermediation.
26 Figure 1 summarizes α-rule.
In the next section I will fully solve the model with 4 banks to show how financial institutions choose their bilateral lending and borrowing decisions to maximize their profit when position of a bank in the financial structure determines the share of the surplus he gains.
3 Economy with Four Banks
Assume there are two I and two N I banks, I = {I 1 , I 2 } and NI = {N I 1 , N I 2 }. Each I bank receives an investment opportunity with probability q. Assume p f = 1, and H I (.) has unit mass on s = 0 while H N I has unit mass on s = 1. This means I banks raise no funds from households while N Is raise s = 1. 28 Assume V i = V I for every i ∈ I and V j = V N I for every j ∈ NI. Assume the support of the asset return distribution has two mass points:
26 I should emphasize that choice of this rule is merely to simplify the exposition. α-rule has a particularly desirable characteristic which greatly simplifies the calculations: each borrower does not care about the chain traversed by each unit of fund he receives, so face value of unit debt payable to each lender can be calculated in a straight forward manner regardless of the source of each unit of funds. In other words D ij only depends on the distance of i to final borrower.
27 In other words the profits of a bank not only depends on his lending and borrowings, but also on that o his counterparties, his counterparties' counterparties and so on.
28 Zero is just a normalization, I will provide more general intuition later.
the project succeeds with probability p and returns U , and fails with probability 1 − p and returns 0.
29R
= R with probability p 0 otherwise A lending relationship between an I and N I is efficient if (3) i.e. the net expected return from the project should cover the expected cost which is the expected loss in outside value of the two banks since both the lender and borrower will fail if the project fails (borrower cannot pay the lender and lender cannot pay the households he borrowed from. Recall there is no liquidity choice). The participation constraints for the lender and borrower are the following, respectively:
Assume condition 3 as well as participation constraint of both I and N I are satisfied, so that it is always efficient for an N I bank to lend to an I bank directly. Note that with only two banks whenever direct lending from banks who supply the funds to bank who invests them happens, it will be efficient. As a result, with only one lender and one borrower equilibrium can only exhibit under-investment, in the form of under-lending, 30 compared to socially optimal outcome. Surprisingly, I will show that with more banks and possibility of multiple investment opportunities the equilibrium involves over lending among a certain group of banks. More generally, whether undertaking a project of scale s is efficient or not depends on the scale, which determines the net present value, as well as the expected cost of defaults that it can entail. Loosely speaking, all else equal, if the initial investment for a project is raised through a longer intermediation chain the project must be more profitable, or the scale should be larger to justify the possible loss to all the intermediaries.
I swill first analyze the model under the following assumption. Later I relax the assumption incorporate the additional force that it introduce.
29 The binomial nature of project return is purely for simplicity and is inconsequential for the results. 30 under-exposure to banks who have investment opportunities. Assumption 2. Assume bank i raises funding from households. His funding will be allocated randomly with equal probability to exactly one of I ∈ I R to whom i is connected, as defined in 1.
I start with the above assumption for two main reasons: first, it simplifies the exposition. More importantly, it allows me to separately analyze the two roles of intermediators in the model. The first role, which survives under the above assumption is to channel funds to different points of the financial system where an investment opportunity arise and avoid under-investment. The second role, which is disabled by this assumption, is diversification. Intuitively, consider a lender j (who can be an intermediator) who is a direct lender to subset a B ∈ N.
31 j randomly channels all of his available funds to a single one of banks in B so if the final borrow in that particular path fails, j fails as well. By induction on the length of path, when an I ∈ I R who has invested fails, any bank who has lent to him (directly or indirectly) fails.
32
Shutting down diversification allows me to clearly exhibit an important force of the model which has been widely overlooked:
33 how each bank's motive to absorb intermediation spreads mis-align private and social incentives to form lending and borrowing relationships which exposes the banking system as a whole to excessive loss at default. What makes this channel particularly interesting is that it differs in spirit in classic channel for contagion which has been widely studied in the recent years. Here, banks choose to expose themselves to excessive probability of failure in order to e able to absorb intermediation rent. So the additional loss born by the system is failure of this particular bank, not contagion from this bank to other banks. In other words the above assumption allows me to fix all other banks who fail due to failure of an investment, and only focus on possible incremental cost of the particular intermediator bank. I will then remove this assumption and allow for diversification which would enable me to analyze rich interaction of the two channels, particularly at the level of I banks.
Social Planner Problem
Consider the problem of a social planner who wants to maximize the total surplus subject to minimum constraint (1). In other words, I assume the social planner faces the same lending capacity constraint that each individual bank faces: the social planner should decide on 31 B can include both I and N I bank. 32 The exact proof of this argument as well as other necessary lemmas are provided in the appendix. 33 The only exception that I know of is Atkeson et al. [2013] , which has the same channel although in a different context. the potential conterparties of each bank before investment opportunities are realized, and minimum size constraint should also be satisfied. Social planner's optimization problem can be written as:
subject to (1) at every i ∈ N Under (3) maximizing scale of investment is efficient as the return on the asset exhibits constant return to scale. So the social planner's problem reduces to minimizing expected loss of default due to failure of project(s). Note that when a project fails, not only the I bank who has undertaken the project fails, 34 but also there will be contagion: I will not be able to pay his lenders back and based on lenders' portfolios, they some times fail as well.
The following theorem characterizes the solution to social planner's problem.
Theorem 1. With two I and two N I banks, the solution to social planner problem is to have one N I bank be the intermediary, borrow from the other N I and lend to both Is. Figure 2a depicts the solution.
The main idea of the proof is the following: Social planner's objective is to maximize total net return from the projects minus the expected loss, and he does not care about the division of surplus. Assume N I 1 is the N I bank referred as "intermediator" in the above theorem. The idea is that given that maximizing scale of invest requires that N I 1 lends to I 1 and I 2 when either of them has an investment opportunity, he can as well intermediate the funds raised by N I 2 , and this intermediation does not expose N I 1 to any extra risk.
35 As such, the scale of investment is maximized and the cost in the event of failure is minimized. A very similar intuition goes through in the general case. Note that there are three roles in the financial system: Lender (i.e. raise money from households), borrower (i.e. invest in the risky project), and borrower-lender (i.e. intermediator). The problem is set such that lender and borrower are inherent properties of a bank. Then the question boils down to which bank is more suitable to take on the third role. In other words which ability, being a lender-by-design (N I) or borrower-by-design (I) is the one that legitimize (from a
Figure 2: Possible Equilibria for an Economy with Two I and Two N I social perspective) being an intermediator. The answer is that although an intermediator both borrows and lends, but a suitable one is a lender-by-design, and the intuition is quite interesting: The social incentive for having a bank involved in an investment depends on the total contribution of the bank minus its expected loss due to failure. If either party is not making its fundamental contribution but is taking on a secondary role, the social planner might be able to improve the surplus by removing him all together and allocating the secondary role to a different bank. For a borrower, the fundamental contribution is the access to investment opportunity, while for the lender it is the ability to provide funds otherwise not available for investment. If a borrower I 1 is not investing, there is no social gain from his presence in the intermediation chain if all the funds can still be channeled to the borrower who is taking on the investment (through a different lending structure). Moreover, there is a social loss from exposing I 1 to risk of default by I 2 . In contrast to borrowers, it is optimal for all lenders to lend regardless of who is doing the investment, so there is no extra exposure to risk if one of them acts as intermediator.
In Figure 2 , panel 2b exhibits under-investment, while panels 2c and 2d involve excessive exposure to risky investment. In the next section I will characterize the range of parameters for which each structure is an equilibrium. 
Equilibrium
Consider the network structures in Figure 2 . As already mentioned in the previous section, these are the only possible equilibria of the economy with four banks.
Lemma 1. Network structures depicted in Figure 2 are the only possible equilibria with four banks.
Let X = pR − 1 be the net expected return of the project. Also, let κ =
, which is the ratio of intermediation spread per unit intermediated over the expected cost of default due to intermediation (for I bank). Finally, letκ = 1 + q 2(1−q) and κ = p(1−q)(1−α)
(1−p)
. The next theorem characterizes the range of parameters for which each financial structure is an equilibrium. Figure 3 depicts the range of equilibria as a function of κ. Consider the financial network in 2b. Note that this structure differs from the three other financial structures in that it exhibits under-investment due to under-lending: bank I 2 never gets to invest even if he receives an investment opportunity since he does not have access to any source of funds. Moreover, note that there are two channels to avoid the under-investment: First, if intermediation spreads are high enough to cover the expected cost of default 36 born by the well-funded I bank (here, bank I 2 ), I 1 and I 2 will deviate by adding e I 2 I 1 , and the economy switches from one inefficient equilibrium to the other. This happens if κ ≤ 1 2
. Second, if being intermediated does not decrease the rate that lender receives dramatically, the two N I bank can agree to form an intermediation chain among themselves to be able to lend to both I banks and fund every investment opportunity.
Recall that an equilibrium structure should be immune to deviation of coalition of at most 4 banks together.
37 The most interesting observation is that only for an empty or narrow range of κ, κ < κ, is the only equilibrium efficient. In fact for sufficiently small α, for every set of parameter values there is at least one inefficient equilibrium and for κ > 1 all the equilibria are inefficient. For larger values of α, as q increases κ → 0 and the same result holds for almost every set of parameter values. The same intuition generalizes to networks with more banks. The next section discusses the tension between stability and efficiency in more detail.
Stability versus Efficiency
In order to clearly see why social and private incentives are misaligned in presence of intermediation rents, lets focus on two specific equilibria in Figure 2 , namely 2a and 2c. Intuitively, the main difference among the two structures is the following: In 2c regardless of which bank(s) have the investment opportunity, all the banks are involved as either investor, intermediator or final lender in every single investment, while in 2a if only one I invests the other I bank is not exposed to the risk of investment failure. Given that the two banks' project returns are iid, the expected return in a financial structure only depends on the scale of investment and not on how it is distributed among investors. Since in both 2a and 2c both units are always invested, the net expected return of the risky investment is the same and the two structures only differ in cost of default, which I just argued is lower in 2a.
Next observe that in comparing 2a and 2c, the incremental cost of default in 2c is born by I banks, i.e. precisely the banks who can choose to be out of the chain of intermediation (as in 2a). The fact that for κ > 1 2c is the only equilibrium implies that the I banks intentionally choose to expose themselves to this incremental cost, which is quite counter-36 due to exposure to counterpart risk 37 In this special case, since K = 4, the equilibrium concept is exactly Strong strict Nash equilibrium. However, k = 4 has a special interpretation: An intermediation chain involves at least three banks. As a result a deviation driven by intermediation motives would require at least three banks. The fourth member of deviation is for technical reasons to ensure strictness. intuitive. The idea is that there are rents in the financial system that can be captured only through voluntary exposure to counterpart risk, and if these rents are high enough banks would choose to suffer the additional expected loss in order to capture these rents.
To study the individual incentives in equilibrium, consider the two lending structures depicted in Figure 4 . Two lending arrangements differ in that there is no intermediation in 4a while in 4b there is. It is straightforward to verify the face values of debt in each structure:
If the intermediation spread is high enough I banks would want to deviate from 2a to 2c in order to earn the spread. Finally, one wonders why an N I bank agrees to be part of the deviation? The answer is that each bank chooses to lend to counterparties who offer highest rate of returns. Given that there are intermediation spreads, being close to the bank who invests translates to higher returns and in 2a N I 2 is always far from the bank who invests. As a result he also has an incentive and joins a deviation in which he is located closer to the banks who invest.
The reason that the above joint deviation leads to inefficiency is that all the gains are purely redistributional, while the loss is incremental. On the benefit side, the intermediation spreads were being captured by other banks in 2a which means the deviation did not create any extra surplus. On the cost side, fewer banks fail when a project fail in 2a, which means deviating to 2c has real welfare losses. However, since the gain from redistribution of surplus cover the incremental loss of deviating coalition, they choose to deviate. Note that as long as α < 1 there is a non-empty region for parameter values where I banks are willing to join a coalition with one of N Is and deviate from structure 2a to 2c. One simple sufficient condition is to have (pU −1) (1−p)V > M , for some large enough constant M . Furthermore, it is not necessary that I banks raise zero funds from households. What is important is that their contribution to scale of investment should not be sufficient to justify their risk taking behavior. To be more precise, assume I 1 has raised < 1 funds from households. Recall that without intermediation, participation constraint of a direct lender (I 1 in this case) to I 2 requires that ζ(pU − 1) ≥ (1 − p)V I . Letˆ be the amount of funds for which the above inequality holds with equality. Then for any <ˆ , it is more efficient that an N I bank with one unit raised from households do the intermediation as opposed to I 1 .
Finally, note that three of the four equilibria, 2a, 2c and 2d can not be Pareto ranked. The main intuition is that the rent-seeking behavior of banks implies that they attempt to change the distribution of surplus in their own favor and create inefficiency while doing so, as a result not everyone's profits are hurt. So neither network structure Pareto dominate the other.
General Results
Given the above discussion, here I will characterize all the equilibira and characterize the region for parameters where all the equilibria are inefficient. I use Strong strict Nash Equilibrium concept, however in each theorem I will be specific about what is the smallest size of deviation which would allow the result to go through.
Theorem 3. Assume k N I > k I , and κ > M for a properly chosen constant M . Then with any size of deviating coalition there is a family of equilibria with the following structure: Choose a subset S of the I banks, which I refer to as "core". Each N I bank is connected to exactly one I ∈ S, such that there are at least k I N I banks connected to each I ∈ S. Every I ∈ S is connected to every other I bank, and every I ∈ S is not connected to any other I bank. This family of equilibria survives under any size of deviating coalitions.
The main idea of the general proof is the following: if project is profitable enough, I banks will be able to cover their cost of default using the intermediated rents. Moreover, they will be able to connect to every other I bank if they have enough N I lenders. On the other hand, each N I bank would want to get as high of a return as possible (so be as close as possible to an I bank), as well as receive positive return as often as possible (so be connected to a well-connected I bank). Since there are sufficiently many N I banks, all I banks are able to be sufficiently well connected, so any subset of well connected I banks can act as intermediator in a stable structure. Clearly, there are multiple equilibria but all of them share the same properties. The degree of inefficiency varies among the equilibria, and equilibria with smaller S (i.e. fewer I banks as intermediators) are more efficient.
Moreover, let s = |S| be the size of the set of intermediating I banks. Then there exist a sequence of strictly increasing constants {M s } s=1,··· ,k I , where M = M k I in theorem 3, and the financial structure with core size s as described above is an equilibrium iff κ > M s . In other words, financial structures with smaller core sizes are equilibria for a wider range of parameter.
The next theorem limits the structure of intermediation chain among N I banks in any possible equilibrium.
Theorem 4. In any equilibrium, there is no chain of intermediation among N I banks which involves 3 or more N I banks such that at least two of them lend directly to I banks.
Allowing coalitions of size k = 2k I + 1 is sufficient to guarantee theorem 4 for any set of parameter, while it is not necessary depending on the structure of the network.
Conclusion
I study a strategic model of network formation among banks to explore how the interaction among banks leads to different network structures in equilibrium. The central idea of this paper is to explore the possibility that some banks in the financial sector are able to use their lending and borrowing relationships to tilt the division of surplus in their favor, even if the implied change in the financial network hurts the total surplus of the economy. The model predicts that there is too much (gross) exposure among banks who actively involve in risky investment and too little among those who mainly provide funding. In addition, banks who intermediate among other banks are exposed to excessive counterparty risk. The inefficiency stems from the differential ability of banks to offer return on their borrowing which allows some banks to better attract funds from within the banking sector, and assume the role of main intermediator of funds in the financial network even if they choose to expose themselves (and tho whole financial system) to excessive cost of default. As a result, equilibrium financial architecture exhibits inefficiency in the form of too many defaults when risky investments fail. Moreover, the model predicts a core-periphery structure for the equilibrium financial network, i.e. a small number of very interconnected banks that trade with many other banks and a large number of banks that trade with a small number of counterparties.
It is a well known phenomena that agents (in this case banks) rent-seek to change the distribution of surplus in their own favor. In the context of the model banks can seek rents by acting as intermediators. However, unlike most of the literature these rents does not come from higher bargaining power. In fact, bargaining power is assumed to be constant. By borrowing from more banks and lending to more banks the intermediator does earn more rents, but he also channels funds to where investment opportunities are, so itermediation does enhance the total surplus. The question which naturally arises is whether there are any welfare costs associated with intermediation? The answer depends on the characteristics of the intermediator: if bank b contributes to the scale of investment by channeling fund from outside the financial system then intermediating additional funds within the system does not expose him (and the banking system as a whole) to any extra risk, so b is an appropriate intermediator. On the contrary, if b lends only if he intermediates funds within the system, that implies that b's lending decision is privately justified only via intermediation rents. Since these rents exist in the system even without b if the same scale of investment is supported, b's role as an intermediary does not enhance the surplus but only increase the loss in the event that the investment fails. Such b should not be an intermediary. In equilibrium, competition implies that only borrowers who offer highest rates are able to attract lenders, and they will be exactly the banks who will be intermediating the funds as well. Since banks who can potentially invest are able to offer the highest rates, in equilibrium they emerge as intermediators although they might not be contributing to the scale of the project by providing additional funds and consequently their existence along the intermediation chain, in any role other than final investor, exposes the system to additional risk.
Finally, I would like to mention a few directions for future work. One interesting extension deals with explicit modeling of spill over to the real economy, which is currently modeled as exogenous value of each bank (unrelated to the risky investment). An interesting direction is to explicitly model decreasing return to scale among bank services to the real sector of economy 38 and study the amplification mechanism which results from interaction with exposure to counterparty risk. Moreover, new insights can emerge from simulating the model with more complicated interactions and try to match moments from the data. This would enable me to empirically quantify the magnitude of the inefficiency, which would then allow for a rigorous cost-benefit analysis of different policies in the context of the model. However, this would be a very challenging task since very little data is available on exposures which involve investment banks.
appendix 6.1 Alternative Rules for Surplus Division
Here I will discuss two alternative rules for surplus division along each intermediation chain, and I show that all the results are invariant to the rule which is used as long as it provide all the parties with positive share of surplus.
ζ-Rule
I call the first alternative mechanism the ζ-rule. When a bank i borrows from bank j, the face value of debt contract is set such that the lender of the relationship receives ζ fraction of the surplus generated by that particular lending relationship. Importantly, this surplus depends on the return distribution for the relationship borrower as well as the cost of funds for the relationship lender. In other words, if the lender(intermediator) has to bear a high cost of funds he can pass it on to his borrower, i.e. unlike the α-rule developed in earlier, the ultimate lender and borrower share the cost of intermediation. The above form of division of surplus that can be viewed as an extension of Nash Bargaining with bargaining power ζ to the lender in a relationship. The design of this division rule warrants some explanation, which I will try to provide later in this section.
Consider figure 4. In the left panel structure, D is set such that each of the two direct lenders get fraction ζ of the surplus which is generated using their resources lent to I:
As a result, each direct lender N I gets ζ(pR − 1) and the borrower I gets 2(1 − ζ)(pU − 1). Now consider the structure in the right panel. If N I 2 lends to I at face value D 2 , he basically earns pD 2 using the resources he has borrowed from N I 1 , and ζ portion of this surplus should be passed on to N I 1 through debt contract with face value D 1 . So N I 2 has to pay a cost of 1 for the unit he borrows from outsiders and pD 1 for the unit he borrows from N I 1 . So his profit in his lending relationship should be ζ proportion of the net gains from this relationship, which is its gross surplus (pU ) minus the cost of funds from the perspective of N I 2 and I (1 + pD 1 ) So D 1 is set such that:
pD 1 − 1 = ζ(pD 2 − 1)
where the last inequality holds since D 2 ≤ U . Now N I 2 lends two units to I, so he would earn 2D 2 if the project is successful. So we should have: (1 − ζ)) − ζ 2
(1 − ζ)
(1 − ζ)) > D which means N I 2 passes part of his cost of borrowing, which is the surplus which should be payed out to N I 1 , to the ultimate borrower I. In this way N I 2 acts as an intermediator which intermediates resources from N I 1 to I and captures part of the surplus. Note that D 2 > D means that in the right panel, more of the surplus goes to N I banks as a whole compared to the left panel. However, D 1 < D implies that the leaf lender N I 1 , i.e. the bank which does not do any intermediation and is a pure lender, gets a smaller surplus in the chain compared to what he would get if he was connected to I bank directly. In this sense, no N I bank can commit to join as the last lender of an intermediation chain rather than as a direct lender to I. This commitment problem reduces the share of N I banks from the surplus as a whole. With this preliminary intuition I move on to the general characterization of the rule for surplus division. Consider a node N I k in the middle of the chain at distance k from the leaf lender (leaf lender is the N I bank at the very beginning of the chain who only lends. Normalize his distant to himself to be 1). Assume N I k borrows m k−1 units from N I k−1 and has raised m k − m k−1 units from outsiders, so he will lend m k units to N I k+1 who in turn lends m k+1 units to his borrower. Note that if N I k+1 is an I node who is investing, m k+1 = 0. Let D 
The recursive equation 6 basically says that an intermediator passes on (1 − ζ) of his cost of borrowing from within the network to his own borrower. As a result, the terms of each lending contract is borrower-lender pair specific, which is a strong characteristic of the model.
Next, consider the equilibrium. The profits of an I bank in either structure is: ))] the borrower (who has no money). The middle structure corresponds to a lender lending one unit to an intermediator, and the intermediator raising one additional unit from outsiders and then lending both units to the final borrower. The third structure is a lender lending one unit to the intermediator, and the intermediator lending that one single unit to the final borrower. Note that the assumption is that when there is an intermediator, without him lender is unable to lend to the borrower. Let v L , v B and v I denote Shapley values for lender, borrower and intermediator respectively (the latter is relevant only in the last two structures). So for the left structure we have:
For the middle structure we have: And the face value of the debt should be set such that in expectation each bank receives his Shapley value (net of what he has to pay outside lenders which is 1 in expectation). Note that since in this problem all the banks in each lending relationship are essential to the lending, each get 1 n of the surplus wheren is the number of banks involved in that lending (2 for direct and 3 for intermediated lending). Now we can use the Shapley values computed above to check whether there can be a sequence of profitable unilateral and bilateral deviations which would lead from structure (2) to structure (1) in figure ? ?. As in section 3, I check if we can have S A sufficient condition for the above to hold is pU −1 (1−p)V > 6. So it can be seen that since Shapley value also provides a non-trivial division of surplus among all the parties involved in a relationship lending, it can as well be used to show my point. The main qualitative difference is that in Shapley value computation, the pure lender receives the same surplus no matter if the intermediator provides his unit of funds or not, so in terms of values in section 3, using Shaple value division of surplus leads to D , which does not affect the qualitative results.
